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Press freedom emerged, with much debate and agony, in a world of local papers and 
small publishers that were easily threatened by the power of Church and state.   It 
survives unquestioned in a world of border-crossing communications technologies 
and media conglomerates. Yet in developed societies the media are now both less 
threatened by Church and state, and more exposed to concentrated market power.  In 
this new world, the case for press freedom deserves a fresh look.  Traditional 
arguments against censorship—the control of content—may still convince. But how 
robust are arguments against standards and disciplines for that bear not on content, 
but on the ways the media work?   Is the best conception of press freedom for our 




Truth Seeking and Freedom of Expression 
 
The oldest arguments for press freedom claim that it is needed for discovering truth.   
“Who”, Milton blustered, “ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter?”.2      The late Bernard Williams pointed out that „free and open 
encounters‟ have their problems when the aim is truth.      He notes that “...in 
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institutions that are expressly dedicated to finding out the truth, such as universities, 
research institutes, and courts of law, speech is not at all unregulated.   People cannot 
come in from outside, speak when they feel like it, make endless irrelevant, or 
insulting, interventions, and so on; they cannot invoke a right to do so, and no-one 
thinks that things would go better in the direction of truth if they could.” 3 Truth-
seeking needs careful process and safeguards; freedom to propose and challenge 
content, for example, but not freedom to neglect or travesty evidence.  
 
Nor can we plausibly equate press and media freedom with unrestricted freedom of 
expression.   We may agree with John Stuart Mill that individuals should have     
“absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, 
scientific, moral, or theological”, and that freedom of expression for individuals is 
“practically inseparable” from their “liberty of expressing and publishing opinions”.4  
We may rejoice that freedom of expression for individuals is endorsed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the European Convention of Human 
Rights and in many constitutions.  
5
  We may think that even when individuals 
express themselves inaccurately and obscurely, it is better that they be free to do so    
(egregious defamation and hate speech apart). 
 
But these considerations do not show that powerful institutions and vested interests 
should also enjoy unfettered freedom of expression. We don‟t generally accord such 
freedom to powerful institutions.  The communication of governments, companies, 
public bodies and universities (for example) is properly constrained by requirements 
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for accountability and disciplined by freedom of information legislation; academic 
freedom is constrained by practices such as peer review and demands for research 
integrity.   Why then should the businesses that control newspapers or radio and TV 
channels enjoy unfettered freedom of expression?       Why should the powerful 
media conglomerates controlled by Rupert Murdoch or Sylvio Berlusconi have the 
same freedom of expression as the vulnerable individuals whom conventions and 
constitutions are designed to protect?   
 
 
Press Freedom for Democracy 
 
A better argument for press freedom is that citizens in democracies need it.  If the 
press is unfree, citizens may be uninformed and unable to make sound decisions.      
But the needs of democracy do not and cannot show that the media should enjoy 
unfettered freedom of expression.  Those needs justify press freedom only insofar as 
it is configured to support citizens and democracy.   They can justify press freedom 
that aims at informing citizens accurately and in ways that they can assess, so 
enabling them to judge for themselves.   They cannot justify a press that rejects these 
aims.  A press that did so would be free to misinform citizens, to manipulate public 
opinion and so to damage democracy.  
 
Accurate reporting is hardly a controversial aim, and is central to press and 
broadcasting codes.  Yet British newspapers and broadcasters that ostensibly work to 
such codes often publish and broadcast inaccuracies. Some are unintended: working 
to tight deadlines leads to mistakes.   But if inaccuracies are allowed to stand 
uncorrected once noted, they can no longer be excused as mistakes.       Serious 
commitment to accuracy may not require total accuracy, but it does require prompt 
and prominent correction of mistakes, and robust disciplines for minimising them.  
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Broadcasters often do better by accuracy, since their licences often require them to 
meet Public Service Broadcasting standards.   Yet even in public service 
broadcasting, commitments to accuracy and other public service standards sometimes 
slip;  and commitment to quite elementary   standards applied to  those in public 
life—such as declarations of interests and systems for avoiding conflicts of interest—
are often absent or disregarded.    
 
And accuracy is not enough.  If the media are to support democracy they must also 
communicate in ways which their audiences can assess.  Unless readers, listeners and 
viewers can judge media claims for themselves, they will not be able to tell truth 
from rumour, to distinguish the credible from the flaky, or to judge where to place 
and where to refuse trust.    Serious communication offers its audiences context and 
clues, evidence and qualifications, thereby enabling them to judge the accuracy of the 
claims they encounter.    
  
Self-Regulation or Statutory Regulation? 
 
These standards are hardly alien.  Both broadcasters and newspapers broadly accept 
that reporting should be accurate; the more reflective also accept that accuracy 
without assessability sets too low a standard.       Yet large parts of the British media, 
including many newspapers, have not pursued these commitments with any vigour.    
Since 1991 the newspapers have accepted a minimal degree of self-regulation 
provided by the Press Complaints Commission.
6
  Their approach to self-regulation 
comes into play only where there is a complaint; it does little for individuals who 
shun publicity; it does not correct inaccuracies where there is no complaint.      Even 
when a complaint is „resolved‟ in favour of a complainant, little may change.   
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Self-regulation need not be trivial.  A self-regulating media could use many of the 
routines and disciplines that other powerful institutions deploy (and in some cases are 
required to deploy) to achieve a degree of openness and accountability.   Some parts 
of the media use some of them; most do not.  Self-regulating newspapers and 
broadcasters could distinguish reporting from commentary; they could do more fact 
checking; they could develop robust procedures for checking and challenging 
reliance on „unattributable sources‟; they could correct inaccuracies prominently, 
systematically and independently.  They could require owners, editors, programme 
makers, commentators and reporters to disclose their interests, and especially their 
financial interests; they could publish those declarations; they could debar reporting 
and commentary by those with a declared interest in a matter.  They could develop 
independently administered, professionally assisted „rights of reply‟ that were 
guaranteed the same prominence as the claims or comments to which they respond.  
They could routinely publish details of payments made to obtain „stories‟; they could 
sanction journalists who accept payments, bribes or favours to cover, or not cover, 
certain topics, or to cover them with a certain slant; they could routinely publish the 
names of those sanctioned; they could put an end to „cheque-book journalism‟.     
They could lobby as hard for legal protection of rights to individual privacy as they 
did for freedom of information (both are part of human rights conventions; arguably 
institutionalising one without the other has undermined an intended balance).   
 
If Self-Regulation Fails? 
 
Are these standards realistic?  Clearly they can be met. Some publications, some 
editors, some programmes and some journalists meet many of them. So there is no 
intrinsic reason to think that they are unachievable.  Nevertheless, they may be 
unrealistic.   There is little appetite for securing these standards more generally—
even in parts of the media that are rather keen on accountability for others.    
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If this reluctance persists, statutory regulation would be possible. Improved self-
regulation looks preferable to statutory regulation.  But if it remains   unobtainable, 
these arguments show that statutory regulation that sets requirements on media 
process  (rather than  on media content) in order to support accuracy and assessability 
need  not be an unacceptable intrusion into journalistic professionalism, editorial 
independence or freedom of the press.  At present, the problem in the UK lies not 
with self-regulation as such, but with   inadequate, indeed token, self-regulation 
Abuses of press freedom are not the „price of democracy‟.  They damage democracy.  
At some point, persistent abuse creates the case for statutory regulation, or for a 
mixture of statutory and self regulation. 
 
 . If press freedom is best justified by the 
extent to which it safeguards and promotes diverse, intelligible, honest and 
assessable communication, thereby supporting democracy and citizenship, measures 
needed to ensure that the media actually serve those purposes are can be  justified.     
 
These conclusions raise questions for citizens as well as for the media.   Should we 
fear that any change in current conceptions of press freedom will lead back to 
censorship or excessive secrecy?  Or should we fear that it we do not act to protect 
public culture and civility, we will see further damage to democratic debate and to 
democracy?    Should we even fear that if media power remains unaccountable it will 
(if things go badly) ultimately threaten individual freedom of expression?  Why do 
we not take steps to stop powerful institutions arrogating individual rights to freedom 
of expression?     Are we so fearful of statutory regulation, and of the powerful 
interests that argue against any but token self regulation, that we will acquiesce in 
increasing domination of the media by commercial interests?     These questions are 
not idle. 
   
 
  
